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Abstract
There are some obstacles faced by Islamic 
microfinance institutions in performing Islamic 
financial contracts as purely demanded by Islamic 
law. In case of Bayt al-Maal wa al-Tamweel (BMT), 
the application of Islamic financial contracts needs 
a special approach and innovation. By taking 
BMT Sidogiri of East Java as the researchsite, 
this studyqualitatively evaluated the practice of 
murabahah, mudlarabah, and musharakah contracts 
conducted by such an insti-tution.In examining 
these obstacles, this study had conducted several in-
depth interviews with the branch manajer of BMT 
Sidogiri of Malang City. The findings revealed 
that the obstacles in performing Islamic financial 
contracts are dominatedby lack of knowledge, 
asymmetric information, limited cooperation among 
related institutions, opportunistic behavior, and lack 
of social capital. To overcome these obstacles, it is 
recommended that the practices of Islamic financial 
transactions were not only in line with shari’ah-
compliant but also with shari’ah-based schemes.
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INTRODUCTION
After the enactment of Law no. 21/2008, Islamic finance 
institutions increasingly show their existence in Indonesia’s 
financial industry. Until August 2016, 11 Islamic commercial 
banks have been established, and 23 Islamic banking units are 
spreading in 2564 offices across the country. Alongside this, 
Islamic Rural Banks also grew to 163 BPRS with 439 offices. 
While  Islamic commercial banks work in the area to finance 
large businesses, BPRS serve to finance small communities, 
especially micro, small and medium entrepreneurs (Sudrajat, 
2014).
In addition to these Islamic finance institutions, Bayt al-
Maal wa al-Tamweel (BMT) emerged as an Islamic microfinance 
institution that obtained the legality from the Ministry of 
Cooperatives and SMEs. As their legality is not ruled under 
the banking law, the characteristics of BMT in the economic 
development are more flexible than Islamic banks or BPRS. 
Unfor-tunately, the number of BMTs on the national stage has 
been not known exactly (Sakti, 2013) but Masyithoh (2014) noted 
that by 2013 the number of BMTs has reached more than 5500 
units with assets ranging from hundreds of millions to trillions 
of rupiah.
The most dominant financing applied inIslamic finance 
institutions is murabahah and musharakah which is based on the 
principle of profit sharing. In August 2016 musharakahfinancing 
grew 19% from 14.9% in the previous year, whereas murabahah 
financing grew 9.6% increased 13.3% in the previous year. 
The increasinglytrend of musyarakah financing in August 2016 
showed a slowly transition from revenue sharing to profit 
and loss sharing. Hence, the performance of Islamic finance 
institutions has been influenced by the amount of finan-cing 
disbursement and composition which is at the same time 
become the main source of profit (Sutrisno, 2016).
Meanwhile, BMT occupies a unique position for its dual 
functions in serving Islamic financing as well as social services. 
One of the fast growing BMT in Indonesia is BMT UGT Sidogiri, 
began operating on 5 Rabiul Awal 1421 H / June 6, 2000 M in 
Surabaya and then get a Cooperative Law agency from the 
Regional Office with SK Number: 09/BH/KWK.13/VII/ 2000 
in July 22, 2000.
Every year BMT Sidogiri initiates several units of service 
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members in districts/ cities that are considered potential, and 
currently this institution manages 278 branch offices spread all 
over Indonesia. It is noted that BMT Sidogiri’s assets until 2016 
are IDR2.2 trillion, growing by about 41 percent from Rp 1.509 
trillion in 2014. Then, a turnover of IDR16.9 trillion was listed in 
2016. In addition to its development, BMT Sidogiri accomodated 
a membership of 16,010 people in 2016 increased almost twice 
compared to 8,871 people in 2013. People who trusted to save 
their money in BMT UGT Sidogiri as much as 783, 418 people, 
and customers who get financing is noted 137, 981 people.
However, the operationalization of BMT Sidogiri as 
stipulated by the Islamic jurispru-dence still faces many obstacles. 
Among the main obstacles is related to the implementation of 
Islamic financing contracts that are not fully in accordance with 
the provisions of Islamic law. This paper is intended to reveal 
the obstacles in the implementation of Islamic financial contract 
and solutions taken by BMT Sidogiri for solving this problem. 
Related to this is also a question whether Islamic finance 
institutions should perform shari’ah-compliant or shariahbased 
will get the answer.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous studies on Islamic finance institutions (IFIs) 
revealed that IFIs have developed tremendeously. Nowadays, 
IFIs covered more than 50 countries including countries 
of Europe, CIS, USA, and Australia (Tatiana et. el, 2015). 
While in Indonesia, IFIs succeded to record their quantitative 
performance in profit growth, assets, and the number of branch 
office. However, in some extent the practice of Islamic financial 
contracts face some obstacles to be implemented purely and 
needs certain solutions.
Islamic Financial Contract
Islamic financial contracts have been applied on the basis 
of three fundamental principles, they are: there is no riba, free 
from heavy uncertainty (gharar), and preventing from gambling 
transactions (maysir). Moreover, Islamic financial contracts are 
also developed on the principle of justice and partnerships 
(Siddiqui, 2008). On the discussion ofribawhether it is found in 
Islamic financial products or not, it must be specified whether 
there is interest rate but noriba inside so as to the Islamic financial 
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contracts must be characterized asfree riba contractnotinterest free 
contract (Suharto, 2018).
 In IFIs, the position of Islamic contracts is very 
essential since law and Islamic finance are stated as a set of 
contract (Ismail and Tohirin, 2009).In this term, a contract is 
defined as “the conjunction of an offer emanating from one of 
the two contracting parties with the acceptance of the other 
in the manner that affects the subject matter of the contract”. 
To name in specific terms, there are various of contracts, i.e. 
contract of sales and purchases, contract of usufructs, contract 
of sharecropping, partenrships, and equity participation (Shafiai 
and Moi, 2015). For more general practices, the most common 
of Islamic financial contracts are: murabahah, ijarah, musharakah, 
and mudlarabah (Tatiana et. al., 2015).  
According to Dalel and Bessem (2013) murabahah is a 
contract of sale with profit. In this contract, customer gives an 
order to an Islamic finance instituiton to purchase certain good, 
on its behalf, in cash. The customer then takes this good through 
a deferred payment with a margin paid to the institution which 
can be done once or several deadlines.
Meanwhile, ijarah is a leasing contract. It is basically a 
leasing arrangement in which the capital owner as financier 
rents the required assets, property or services to the customer. 
For this service the financier imposed certain fee for the period 
of the rental contract (Nazirwan, 2015).
For partnership contracts, Aljifri and Khandenwal (2013) 
defined musharaka as part-nership relation in which both parties 
have right to participate in management. Profit and loss emerged 
from the contract are shared proportionally to both parties. 
Meanwhile, mudlaraba is partnership relation in which financing 
partner does not participate in management but has access to 
information.
Agency Theory Perspective
According to Shamsuddin and Ismail (2013) agency 
theory or the principal-agent relationship is a theory in which a 
contract allows one or more persons to perform some services on 
their behalf which involve delegating some decision-making to 
the agent. In IFIs, the unit of analysis is the contract between the 
principal and the agent for the specific contract terms is analysed 
to determine the effect of the agency problem. In this regard, 
69IQTISHADIA  Volume 11Nomer 1 2018
principal tends to motivate agents to perform appropriate actions 
to his or her remuneration (Aljifri and Khandelwal, 2013).  
The problem emerged from the principal-agent 
relationship might be caused by two things. Firstly, the problem 
arise when the principal and agent have different objectives, and 
secondly, when the principal feels some difficulties in accessing 
accurate information and behaviour of the agent (Shamsuddin 
and Ismail, 2013). In another form, Syawaluddin et. el (2016) 
pointed out two problems namely problem of hidden action 
and of hidden information. For the problem of hidden action 
the principal cannot take an action on what is done by the agent, 
while for the problem of hidden information the principal has 
less information than the agent.
Since BMT uniqely operates as Islamic community-based 
institution, a close relation-ship between the principal and the 
agent is very essential. Amanah among the two parties, therefore, 
becomes a compulsory requirement for the success of Islamic 
financial contracts practiced by BMT. 
Shari’ah-Compliant vs Shari’ah-Based Scheme
The current issues on Islamic financial practices are 
whether Islamic finance institutions have conducted purely with 
Islamic jurisprudence or not. Some leading scholars classified 
such issues as either Shari’ah-compliant or Shari’ah-based. The 
first is Islamic financial products that mimic their conventional 
counterparts with certain changes for the sake to satisfy religious 
sensitivities. Whereas the second is Islamic financial products 
that strictly follow the real spirit of the Shari’ah (Hasan, 2014).
These issues might be caused by a misleading perception 
among critics that percieved Islamic finance institutions as 
charitable institutions and expect them to do more social work 
than commercial activities (Lone and Ahmad, 2017). In fact, 
Islamic finance institutions are the intermediary institutions that 
take care of investor’s expectations. One of the expectations is 
that the institutions must provide profit to the investors. 
Concerning the current practice of Islamic finance 
institutions, such an issue is still debatable. However, it is 
interesting to provide Hasan’s opinion (2014) that views 
shari’ah-compliant as “manifestation” whereas shari’ah-based 
as “intention”. Performing Islamic law in financial transactions 
takes manifestation as evidence of intention.Allah alone knows 
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what intention guides each of the parties involved in the 
implementation of Islamic financial contracts.
RESEARCH METHOD
This study was conducted on Bayt al-Maal wa al-Tamweel 
(BMT) UGT Sidogiri.Locatedat the center of traditional market 
“Jodipan”, Jl. Kebalen Wetan No. 1Malang City, BMT Sidogiri 
provides Islamic financial services to small traders of the market. 
Among others, BMT Sidogiri is the biggest Islamic microfinance 
institution in East Java and in national level as well. The 
information was based on several interviews with Mr. Junaidi, 
the Branch Manager of BMT Sidogiri. He is very experienced 
individual with wide knowledge on Islamic financial contracts 
and directly involved in the activity and product development 
of BMT UGT Sidogiri.
During November-December 2017, appointments were 
made for in-depth interview with Mr. Junaidi. Interviews were 
carried out in the workplace and voice recorder was used to 
record all information provided by the informant. This research 
conducted two times interviews and each of the interviews 
took one hour and half (90 minutes). Copies of transcripts of 
all recorded conver-sations are in the attachment. As primary 
data source, the interviews were conducted to gather a general 
idea of Islamic microfinance practices especially those are taken 
from the experiences of BMT Sidogiri operations. After all the 
interviews had been fully transcribed, the thematic analysis was 
performed to describe some obstacles in performing Islamic 
financial contracts and the solutions taken by BMT Sidogiri for 
overcoming such obstacles.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on the interview and in-depth review of the 
transcripts, several obstacles and solutions in performing 
Islamic financial contracts are highlighted. Principally, Islamic 
contracts in financial transactions combined ethical facts, 
material facts, information, and condition forms as an integral 
part of the legal contract (Aljifri and Khandelwal, 2013). In 
reality, nevertheless, it is very difficult to purely implement 
the Islamic contracts for several reasons. This paper discussed 
obstacles and solutions for murabahah and for musharakah-
mudlarabah contracts as follows. 
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Obstacles and Solutions in Murabahah Contract
i. Customer Ignorance
The principle difference in Islamic contracts is not fully 
understood by most people. It is often found that the use of 
Islamic terminologies such as loans and financing or interest 
and margin are interchangeable merely caused by customers’ 
confusion and ignorance. However, the problem of customer 
ignorance on Islamic financial practices has been also faced by 
another country. In Tunisia, for example, Bougatef et. al (2012) 
showed that 65% ofrespondents stated that they ignored the 
concept of Islamic finance and its principles.
This problem, of course, will give certain disadvantage 
for practicing Islamic finance purely. To solve this problem, 
BMT UGT Sidogiri then introduced two work standards how 
the institution applies its financial transactions. First, the practice 
of Islamic contract must be based on the principle of validity. 
This means that all contracts that become the operational basis 
of BMT must be legitimated by Islamic law. All contracts must 
be reconciled through fiqh proofs so there is no doubt in their 
application. And secondly, Islamic financial contracts must be 
easily applied. 
The public’s ignorance about Islamic financial contracts is 
further elaborated by the informant as follows:
“We are in the application of the contract is putting 
forward the side of the legitimacy that ease our members 
to understand...this is because for over thirty years our 
society has been entraped conventionally.” When we 
introduce the Islamic contract they think it is the same as 
conventional “.
ii. The Dominance of Conventional Finance
The introduction of murabahah schemes to replace the 
interest-bearing loan contract is not easy. This is due to the 
community’s understanding of conventional financial practices 
is still so strong that it has not been able to distinguish the 
consequences of the loan and murabahah loan contracts. People 
still see the similarities between the two contracts. According 
to Hanif (2011) the major perception in muslim society on the 
domination of conventional financial practices remains becomes 
a specific barrier to implement Islamic financial schemes. 
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Therefore, BMT Sidogiri tried to explain these Islamic 
contracts in ways that are easily understood by the public. One 
way in doingso is to implement the contract in the forms ofbilwafa, 
tashili, and istighlalcontracts as described by the informant as 
follows:
“Among them is akad bilwafa, tashili .... and bay al-wafar, 
that is buying and selling with a promise to buy back .. 
after the item was bought then we make agreement again 
named akad bi al-istighlal”.
In principle, the contracts are implemented so that the 
BMT’s business earned a profit but not by way of imposition of 
interest on the loan. In this case the operating income is obtained 
by way of imposition of rent on goods sold in a certain time. For 
example there are customers who come to BMT ask to be financed 
the purchase of a motorcycle. Meet the needs of these customers, 
BMT then come to the dealer shows a motorcycle to customers 
with a purchase price of IDR20 million. This motorcycle is then 
sold to customers at a price of IDR22. 5 million so that BMT get 
a margin of IDR2.5 million is regarded as ujrah on motorcycle 
rental. Within an agreed period of time, the customer then 
settled the price of the motorcycle.
As profit to be obtained, the BMT set the ujrah amount 
of the financing of goods given to the customer. Even so, the 
customer can actually also negotiate the amount of ujrah in 
accordance with their ability. If the agreement has been reached, 
the customer then fulfilled the installment obligation on the 
agreed price of the goods as well as the ujrah. Here, we see that 
the innovation from murabahah to ijarah is a solution taken by 
BMT to reduce the improper understanding of loan interest and 
murabahah margin.
iii. Lack of Cooperation between Related Institutions
The socialization of Islamic finance contracts is 
constrained by the lack of cooperation with the parties that 
should be concerned to minimize the ignorance of the public 
in halal transaction. For example is the explanation can also be 
provided by the ustad, mubaligh and kyaiwho are able to help 
the acceptance of Islamic financial contracts to be more popular 
in the community. Dakwah material should not only be related 
to ubudiyah but also muammalat which actually covers a large 
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part of Muslims’ activities. The success in disseminating Islamic 
contract is percieved to accelerate the progress of Islamic 
financial business which in turn itreduces the dominance of 
ribawi financial system:
“The obstacles are.. only our employees who know the 
contracts without any help from others; like from our 
ustad, preachers....they only prioritize the explanation of 
the ubudiyah side ... and the two are difficult sometimes 
sometimes just so-so just mask ... just wrote his name aja 
sharia”.
iv. Asymmetric Information
The lack of public knowledge about Islamic finance is 
also caused by inappropriate informa-tion. The assumption 
that the financing in BMT is expensive with a convoluted 
procedure is actually caused by people’s reluctance to find the 
right information. Another cause is the deeds of some customers 
who have problems with BMT then the person spread the word 
that is not true about BMT. Some customers have problems 
in fulfilling their obligations to BMT, for example in terms of 
delayed repayment of installments, but then fabricate stories 
that credited the BMT. The informant described this asymmetric 
information problem as follows:
“Because they do not know .... sometimes just hear from 
people who have problems with us ... let’s say BMT 
problem is not smooth then he because the sense of not 
happy continue to disseminate to others.”
Thus, information that is not symmetrical greatly affected 
the acceptance or rejection of the community of Islamic financial 
contracts offered by BMT. Especially in this case is if the ignorance 
of the community is sharpened by the news that cornering BMT 
will make it more difficult for the spread of Islamic finance 
institutions to run the Islamic principles of business.
To overcome this problem, BMT Sidogiri imposed 
murabahah contract followed by wadiah (savings) agreement. 
In this contract, the murabahah is intended to finance the 
needs of customers with a sale and purchase scheme so that 
BMT obtained certain benefits for the institution’s income. 
Meanwhile, the customer has an obligation with a certain ratio 
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to pay off installments of murabahah financing. Then, looking at 
the habits of the micro traders who are less thorough in financial 
management, BMT offered saving programs for customers that 
is operated on the basis of wadiah agreement. So, every month 
customers need to do two things; 1) pay murabahah installments 
and 2) save their money.
The nature of this saving is of course voluntary action, 
but this actually has many benefits. First, savings will add to 
customers’ wealth without counting every day. By saving the 
customer is trained to be careful in managing their money. 
Second, the routine in saving can be used as an indicator to assess 
customers’ cash flow. And third, the saving also serves as a 
backup for customers in murabahah installment when a customer 
has no money or forgot to pay their monthly installment.
Such systems have in fact facilitated small traders to 
carry out murabahah schemes in an easy and practical way. First, 
traders are now beginning to understand the implementation of 
Islamic financial contracts without studying about it carefully. 
Most of their time is spent on trading so it is not possible to read 
the tenets of Islamic law in buying and selling. And second, the 
saving program created an easier way for traders and BMT to 
settle the obligations and consequences of murabahah financing. 
Through the system of installments and saving, BMT will 
easily control the customers’ cash flow so as to can calculate the 
possibility of customers default. If the saving record is current 
then this indicates that the customer will be able to settle the 
installment obligation smoothly too. The opposite condition can 
happen if the customer is not fluent in saving their money.
v. Competition with the Bank
Nowadays, the microfinance industry turns out to show 
a tight level of competition. The players in this industry are no 
longer met by microfinance institutions but also by large banks. 
This narrow market niche by itself is quite troublesome for BMT 
Sidogiri so it takes a variety of tactics in order to get a profit that 
encourages the growth of BMT business.
At first glance, we assume that big banks will be easy to 
reap many customers. Due to large capital owned, large banks 
certainly do not weigh on lending to small traders. In this area, 
competition can be imagined to be won by big banks while 
microfinance institutions such as BMT Sidogiri will bear the 
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loss and close their business.
However, in a competitive situation with this large bank, 
BMT Sidogiri establishes strategic steps in the form of flexible 
financing services. The informant explained about this as 
follows:
“When there are two institutions of the same job, then 
the winner is for the best service ..... And we’re different, 
if in banking it is indeed more exclusive nature. They 
emphasize the formalities of banking itself, but we apply 
our operations more flexibly.”
Applying flexible service is possible for BMT since its 
nature is actually not banking institution. Although in practice 
BMT Sidogiri serves as a micro finance institution but its legal 
entity as cooperative enables it to work flexibly. In addition, 
BMT Sidogiri also has a social mission of poverty eradication 
which encourages it to approach society more intensively but 
with persuasive and easy ways. For example, some formal 
requirements set by banks are handled in a way that is not so 
formal by BMT Sidogiri so that the convenience and flexibility 
of this service can be accessed by every small trader.
In this context it seems BMT Sidogiri has been able to 
get its own place in the hearts of market traders. It is evidenced 
that the number of market traders who become customers of 
BMT Sidogiri continues to grow even though the big banks 
are also actively providing credit for the needs of the traders’ 
business. Nevertheless, understanding the community about 
Islamic contracts still requires considerable patience because the 
customers always make a comparison between BMT Sidogiri 
and the bank.
Particularly in this case is the comparison of transaction 
fees set to become one of the attention of the customer to choose 
the services provided by the bank or BMT Sidogiri. Customers are 
always looking for transaction costs that are persieved cheaper 
without thinking about halal transaction contract. Therefore, the 
convenience and flexibility of BMT Sidogiri as much as possible 
also leads to reduction of transaction costs for customers. 
Viewed from the social function of BMT, the intension to get 
cheaper transaction costs than the bank is actually a reasonable 
demand. This especially will encourage BMT Sidogiri to balance 
the business functions and social functions so that the goal to 
socializeIslamic contracts will be able to manifest quickly.
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vi. Imperfect Contract 
As the legal istinbath in fiqh, financial transactions using 
murabahah schemes should meet the terms and conditions 
of this contract. In practice, however, the pillar of murabahah 
can not always be fully realized, especially in relation to the 
possession of goods which are subject to BMT. Straightforward 
criticism usually refers to BMT behavior that actually reflects 
only the intermediary in the transaction and not the owner of 
the goods.
Critics assume that the practice of this kind of murbahah 
is not said to be in accordance with the Shari’a as idealized. 
However, providing a stock of goods poses a business risk. 
According to informantts, BMT Sidogiri does not provide stock 
of goods caused by two considerations. First, the provision of 
stock of goods is feared to interfere with the smooth flow of 
cash when the goods are only piled unsold. And secondly, the 
small traders of Jodipan market have so many and varied needs 
that it will be difficult to provide their new stock:
“Stock of commodity ... It’s actually we are a bit choked too 
pack because the needs of our customers are different.”
Considering these reasons, BMT Sidogiri chose to 
implement murabahah schemes without having to provide stock 
of goods as a mark of BMT ownership of goods. As an example 
in motorcycle financing, BMT Sidogiri does the same pattern 
for financing other goods that are needed by customers. That is, 
for every financing of goods needed by customers, BMT officers 
will invite customers to go to the seller of such goods and then 
murabahah transactions carried out in that place as well. As 
mentioned earlier, the practice of such a murabahah gets much 
criticism and is perceived by society as a financial transaction 
that is not different from conventional ways.
Moreover, murabahah is then modified by introducing 
a transaction contract that is easy to implement called as rahn 
tasjili. It was stated in this contract that BMT Sidogiri buy goods 
which are then leased to customers with a certain ujrah as an 
advantage for BMT with the amount set by BMT Sidogiri. For 
example, motorcycle purchased by BMT for IDR15 million 
then handed over to customers with rahn tasjili. For this BMT 
Sidogiri set ujrah for IDR200.000 per month for 2 years. With 
this contract the customer was required to pay the motorcycle 
to BMT Sidogiri IDR19.8 million with details of IDR15.000.000 
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as the purchase price and IDR4.800.000 as BMT’sujrah for two 
years.
Obstacles and Solutions in Partnership Contracts
i. Limitation of Business Scope
The limited target of BMT Sidogiri’s business for micro 
and small traders only becomes an important cause why 
mudlarabah and musharaka contracts were not easy to implement. 
It is true that BMT Sidogiri basically focuses only on small 
scale transaction finance transaction program that serves small 
transaction value. We then understand, when BMT Sidogiri 
focused on micro and small traders it will face limited capasity 
of the traders that is only short-term spin so they may not need 
stocks for developing their business. In this case, the customers 
do not need investment financing facilitated by mudlarabah and 
musyarakah contracts. Therefore, mudlarabah and musharaka in 
the financing performance of BMT Sidogiri is only distributed 
in a small portion of financing as explained by the informant as 
follows:
“Formudlarabah-musyarakah...this actually we are not 
so much .... usually we make it easier and stress to our 
members to better understand its contract because 
mudlarabahbasically is a bit difficult application.”
Because the business partners faced by BMT Sidogiri 
are merely micro and small traders, the operationalization 
of BMT is mostly based on murabahah and rahn tasjili transac-
tions. For daily business, the merchants basically only need a 
help forfullfilment of working capital that may be insufficient 
for investment capital. On the other hand, BMT Sidogiri itself 
try develop its business on the basis of cooperation scheme 
smoothly for obtaining a definite profit. Hence, a way to 
innovate the contract from mudlarabah torahn tasjili gives more 
assurance for both parties. For BMT Sidogiri this contract gives 
them a definite ujrah received every month while for traders this 
contract facilitates them an easy procedure.
Following mudlarabah, it is stated in this contract that 
mudlarabah determined agree-ment in terms of revenue and loss 
sharing. If the cooperation between BMT Sidogiri and market 
traders earn a profit then each will get its share in accordance with 
the agreement. Whereas if such cooperation brings losses then 
BMT Sidogiri must bear this loss as long as the loss is caused by 
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natural considerations in business risk.Thiscontract seemingly 
give a burdensome for BMT Sidogiri so as to clearly requires 
the openness among both parties. In this regard, customers’ 
openness is demonstrated by a good accounting record so that 
BMT Sidogiri can read the business development of its customers. 
Good bookkeeping is also a means of controlso that customers 
do not deceive BMT by giving wrong information. For example 
the customer informs that he is losing money when in fact he 
gets a high profit. Such matters are due to the prevailing general 
presumption that in the contract of cooperation everything will 
be borne by BMT:
“It could also be a risk if mudlarabah contract was in 
improper implementation to the BMT....we are worry if 
they give wrong information, for example they get profit 
five million but say five hundred thousand only...no 
proof... but, when something wrong happens during this 
cooperation we must bear the risk.”
ii. Opportunistic Behavior
The impact of the absence of good bookkeeping is that 
small traders as BMT’s customers behave without a planned 
business size. Trafficking or buying and selling is undertaken 
and sometimes traders think to act only selfishly. The mercurial 
rationality of merchant-driven traders can lead to other 
opportunistic behaviors that may not in accordance with Islamic 
law.
One of the opportunistic behavior of BMT’s customer is 
a consideration to choose a cheaper financing among financial 
institutions. They will compare whether the financing from 
BMT Sidogiri is cheaper than other financial institutions or not. 
Nevertheless, BMT Sidogiri officers never give an explanation of 
the importance of Islamic contract until they fully understand:
“Sometimes they are cheaper orientation just because 
they do not understand it so we give them explanations.”
In the application of mudlarabah contract, for example, it 
is percieved that this contract can encourage more sustainable 
investment because cooperation is based on the calculation of 
profit and loss sharing, not on the basis of unilateral consideration 
of capital owner as applied in conventional financial institution. 
It is also clear that if this business cooperation can generate 
profits then the profit will be divided in accordance with the 
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agreed ratio and if it gets a loss then the BMT Sidogiri also 
share the loss. Even if the loss occurs naturally it drives BMT 
to bear it fully as determined by Islamic law. Such provisions 
are clearly not found in con-ventional financial institutions as 
these institutions usually has established a special mechanism 
that protected them from various forms of loss.
The emergence of opportunistic behavior among 
customers actually encourages BMT Sidogiri to make some 
breakthroughs that facilitate and ease the traders. In this regard, 
BMT Sidogiri strives to make some efficiencies in its financing 
so that it is more affordable by customers. However, depending 
on the level of risk of the project Yousfi (2013) stated that 
mudlarabah contract actually can reduce client’s opportunism. 
This is because, mudlarabah can lead the institution and the 
entrepreneur to provide their first best level of efforts.  
iii. Lack of Social Capital
Financial business basically requires a high degree of 
trust between the parties involved. Especially in mudlarabah and 
musharakah transactions, mutual trust between BMT Sidogiri 
asshohib al-mal and small traders as mudlarib becomes absolutely 
necessary. Thus, trust is a social capital that is indispensable for 
good and successful application of partnership contracts.
During eight years of interacting with small traders in 
the Jodipan market, BMT Sidogiri felt that to apply mudlarabah 
and musharaka contracts required high social capital from the 
traders. Especially the honesty of traders become the absolute 
requirement in rolling mudlarabah funds that the results in this 
contract cannot be predicted with certainty. This means that 
during the bonding period both parties can notensure the gains 
or losses that are avoided. This is certainly very different from 
the system of interest that gives certainty for the owner of the 
money (bank) to not lose money.
Therefore, BMT Sidogiri requires the honesty of customers 
when they want to apply for investment financing with 
mudlarabah scheme. Basically this requirement can be done well 
if the customer has a proper accounting record so that through 
this bookkeeping BMT Sidogiri can estimate customer honesty 
through the smoothness of their cash flow. Nevertheless, BMT 
Sidogiri feels that society now is different in terms of business 
honesty:
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“Yes as it...one is honesty.....sometimes the community 
itself is different, today society is different from our 
society in the past......”.
iv. Limited Knowledge Capacity
Basically BMT Sidogiri is a micro finance institution 
covered by the rules of Islamic law. The operational objectives 
of BMT Sidogiri are thus directed to channel microfinance into 
society activities, especially micro and small traders. Within 
this situation, the operationalization of BMT Sidogiri was 
ultimately limited by a specific market share, in contrast to the 
market share held by the banking sector. Meanwhile, the rules 
muammalat are various with detailed descrip-tions requiring a 
correct understanding of the small traders. This is different from 
the contracts in the bank which is only one type for all forms of 
transactions, namely the loan agreement flowering.
Thus, viewed from the aspect of community literacy on 
Islamic contracts, there has been a gap in the application of 
mudlarabah contract to small traders. This situation ultimately 
led BMT Sidogiri to act rationally by targeting market traders 
to what they can understand. For example, the customers are 
directed to use the contract of rahn tasjili rather than mudlarabah, 
even though mudlarabah contract is more rewarding for BMT 
Sidogiri. 
Due to a lack of knowledge capacity, mudlarabah contract 
was often constrained in its application. This situation drives 
BMT Sidogiri to further expanded the business with various 
Islamic contracts that encourage customers’ business. The 
informant explained this as follows:
“Our market target is different...people who enter the 
bank are educated people, at least they can read and 
write. While people who enter our office are not all 
educated people. Even, they commonly cannot read and 
write well.”
Hence, it can be understood that to perform mudlarabah 
and musharaka is rather difficult for BMT Sidogiri. This is different 
from Islamic banks that generally have customers who are well-
educated. Even many of the customers of Islamic bank are able 
to make a sophisticated book keeping or predict business trends. 
By having educated customers, it certainly allows Islamic bank 
to introduce mudlarabah and musharaka contracts easily.
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Nevertheless, Islamic banks also face the same problem 
in customizing mudlarabah and musharaka contracts. The 
problem of opportunistic behavior cannot be solved easily so 
that Islamic banks are required to always streamline with heavy 
financing to customers. There-fore it is commonly found from 
the performance reports of Islamic banks that the portion of 
mudlarabah and musyarakah enjoyed smaller portion compared 
to murabahah. The greater portion of murabaha clearly indicated 
consumption financing, whereas one of the main objectives of 
the establishment of Islamic banks is to create and grow the 
productive capacity of society through cooperation contracts, 
i.e. mudlarabah and musharaka.
Recognizing such complex issues in mudlarabah 
application, BMT Sidogiri finally declared to return to its khittah 
as microfinance institution, that is to provide working capital for 
micro and small businesses. However, the application of Islamic 
contracts need to be done with caution because the greater the 
financing is given the greater the risk will be accepted by BMT 
Sidogiri:
“We go back to khittah means let the big financing is 
covered by the bank...and we back to the micro business, 
because the greater the financing the greater the risk as 
well.”
CONCLUSION
The objective of Islamic financial contracts is not only 
based on the profit pursuit, but also to meet the ethico-socio-
economic objectives. Islamic law has provided rules and 
regulations on how to meet these objectives when BMT Sidogiri 
implements its financial products developed from the basis of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 
In reality, however, practicing these Islamic contracts 
is not easy. BMT Sidogiri must face many obstacles when the 
institution introduces Islamic financial services to society, 
especially small traders in Jodipan market. Lack of knowledge, 
lack of social capital, asymmetric information, and opportunistic 
behavior are among dominant obstacles that must be overcome. 
Some solutions such as innovate the contracts, flexible 
procedures, door to door services, and dakwah to society are 
taken for addressing the obstacles.
Facing theseconditions, implementing Islamic financial 
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contracts that are in line with shari’ah compliance remains a 
necessary condition for BMT’s products to be Islamic in form. To 
complete the contracts in practice, however, BMT Sidogiri must 
fullfill the products insufficiency condition of being Shari’ah-
based in substance. 
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